Yue Feng, Amedeo De Cesari, and Konstantinos Stathopoulos ♦ We find that firms enlarge the executive pay gap when executive mobility is constrained by more enforceable non-compete agreements. We interpret this finding as evidence that firms increase tournament incentives to…
George Constantinides, Maurizio Montone, Valerio Potì, and Stella Spilioti ♦ Earlier research finds correlation between sentiment and future economic growth, but disagrees on the channel that explains this result. We shed new light on this issue by exploiting cross-sectional variation…
Cheng Jiang, Kose John, Kyeong Hun Lee, Emma Q. Xu ♦ We construct a measure (fLMA) of the extent to which neighboring firms hire similar types of workers, based on the similarity between the labor profile of a firm and…
Bidisha Chakrabarty, Terrence Hendershott, Samarpan Nawn, and Roberto Pascual ♦ We examine hidden orders usage by algorithmic traders (ATs) and non-ATs. ATs extensively use hidden orders but of smaller size than non-ATs, who are the primary contributors to hidden volume.…
William Grieser, Ioannis Spyridopoulos, and Morad Zekhnini ♦ We show that a firm’s financial constraints trigger investment disruptions that propagate through the production network. Propagation effects account for about half of the total investment reduction due to constraints. Network rigidities…
Léa Stern ♦ This paper studies the importance of corporate boards through a learning model in which capital markets learn about incoming directors’ quality. The model’s predictions are tested across a large sample of director appointments. Estimates show that governance-related…
